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BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER 
 With the written consent of the Petitioner and the 
Respondent filed with the Clerk of the Court, Amici re-
spectfully submit this brief as amici curiae.1 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE 
 CHILD USA is the leading national non-profit 
think tank working to end child abuse and neglect in 
the United States. CHILD USA engages in high-level 
legal, social science, and medical research and analysis 
to derive the best public policies to end child abuse and 
neglect. Distinct from an organization engaged in the 
direct delivery of services, CHILD USA develops evi-
dence-based solutions and information needed by poli-
cymakers, youth-serving organizations, courts, media, 
and the public to increase child protection and the com-
mon good. CHILD USA works to protect children from 
abuse in various contexts including its national child 
sex abuse statute of limitations reform initiative. 
CHILD USA’s interests in this case are directly corre-
lated with its mission to increase public safety and 
eliminate barriers to justice for child sex abuse victims 
who have been harmed by individuals and institutions. 
 
 1 Counsel for amici curiae authored this brief in whole and 
no other person or entity other than amici or their counsel has 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. Petitioner and Respondent granted consent to file. 
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 Law, Religion and Civil Rights Professors 
include women and men who teach constitutional 
law, religious studies, theology, and employment 
discrimination law. They are concerned that the 
ministerial exception denies equal opportunity and 
civil rights to thousands of men and women of faith 
who work for religious employers. They wish to en-
sure that the range of scholarly and religious views 
on the ministerial exception—including those that 
understand the widespread problem of discrimina-
tion and the need for legal protection from discrimi-
nation—are before the Court. Their institutional 
identification is for informational purposes only. 
 The Professors are Miguel H. Diaz, Ph.D., Am-
bassador to the Holy See, Ret., The John Courtney 
Murray Chair in Public Service, Loyola University 
Chicago; Charles E. Curran, Elizabeth Scurlock Uni-
versity Professor of Human Values, Southern Method-
ist University; Margaret A. Farley, Gilbert L. Stark 
Professor Emerita of Christian Ethics, Yale Divinity 
School; Prof. Marci Hamilton, Fels Institute of Govern-
ment Professor of Practice, University of Pennsylva-
nia, CEO & Academic Director, CHILD USA; Ann C. 
McGinley, William S. Boyd Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Nevada, Las Vegas, Boyd School of Law; Angela 
D. Morrison, Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M 
University School of Law; Michael A. Olivas, Wm. B. 
Bates Distinguished Chair in Law (retired), University 
of Houston Law Center; Jean Porter, John A. O’Brien 
Professor of Theology, University of Notre Dame; 
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Jessica L. Roberts, Leonard H. Childs Chair in Law, 
University of Houston Law Center. 
 DignityUSA believes that gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
transgender, queer and intersex Catholics in our diver-
sity are members of Christ’s mystical body, numbered 
among the People of God. We have an inherent dignity 
because God created us, Christ died for us, and the 
Holy Spirit sanctified us in Baptism, making us tem-
ples of the Spirit, and channels through which God’s 
love becomes visible. Because of this, it is our right, our 
privilege, and our duty to live the sacramental life of 
the Church, so that we might become more powerful 
instruments of God’s love working among all people. 
 Catholics for Choice was founded in 1973 to 
serve as a voice for Catholics who believe that the 
Catholic tradition supports a woman’s moral and legal 
right to follow her conscience in matters of sexuality 
and reproductive health. We strive to be an expression 
of Catholicism as it is lived by ordinary people. We are 
part of the great majority of the faithful in the Catholic 
church who disagrees with the dictates of the Vatican 
on matters related to sex, marriage, family life and 
motherhood. We are part of the great majority who be-
lieves that Catholic teachings on conscience mean that 
every individual must follow his or her own con-
science—and respect others’ right to do the same. 
 New Ways Ministry is a national Catholic min-
istry of justice and reconciliation for lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, transgender people and the wider Catholic 
Church. In our 39-year history, we have worked with 
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hundreds of parishes, schools, colleges, hospitals, reli-
gious communities of vowed men and women, promot-
ing greater equality for LGBT people. Recently, we 
have been involved with numerous cases where LGBT 
people and their allies have been fired from Catholic 
institutions due to their support for marriage equality 
and other issues. Because we value the Catholic teach-
ing on the inherent human dignity of all people, as well 
as the teaching that promotes justice for workers, we 
strongly support the right of church employees to due 
process when disputes occur. Catholic church employ-
ees do not forgo their U.S. civil rights when employed 
by church institutions. 
 The Quixote Center is a social justice center 
founded in 1976, animated by Catholic social teaching, 
committed to the full participation of all people in 
church and society. A key expression of this commit-
ment to inclusion in terms of gender and sexuality is 
the translation and publication of the Inclusive Bible 
and Lectionaries, which engage the organization in 
communication with church workers and the broader 
community in a variety of Christian denominations. 
Consistent with these values and informed by these re-
lationships, Quixote Center supports this brief. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 A non-Catholic woman and a Catholic laywoman 
cannot be turned into ministers by actions of the fed-
eral courts. The Ninth Circuit ruled properly in these 
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cases that these women were teachers, not ministers, 
and their rulings should be affirmed. See Biel v. St. 
James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
No. 19-348, 2019 WL 6880705 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019); Mor-
rissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. 
App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, No. 19-267, 
2019 WL 6880698 (U.S. Dec. 18, 2019). 
 This Court is presently asked to answer “Whether 
the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses prohibit lay 
teachers at religious elementary schools from bringing 
employment discrimination claims.” 
 NO is the clear answer to that question in this 
case. The civil courts can and should hear these cases 
of disabilities and age discrimination. The Ninth Cir-
cuit correctly ruled that Kristen Biel and Agnes Mor-
rissey-Berru were teachers, not ministers subject to 
the ministerial exception, when they worked for two 
different Catholic schools. See id. Thus Biel’s estate can 
sue for disabilities discrimination, and Morrissey-
Berru for age discrimination. 
 Amici have a long history working both as and for 
employees in religious organizations. They also teach 
and publish in support of employees’ rights. They urge 
this Court to recognize that religious freedom is not 
protected by giving religious organizations a right to 
fire anyone for any reason and avoid liability under 
neutral, generally applicable laws. Allowing this un-
checked freedom undermines the freedom of individu-
als who work for such organizations and allows the 
employers to engage in unfettered wrongdoing. 
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 This Court needs to clarify that religious freedom 
does not protect all conduct. The development of sexual 
abuse cases around this country proves this point. At 
the beginning, many courts thought sexual abuse by 
clergy was a religious decision that could not be exam-
ined by the courts because the abusers’ and their de-
fenders’ decisions were argued as religious. Over time, 
however, courts have recognized that they can decide 
these cases according to neutral principles of law and 
hold the wrongdoers liable for their actions. See, e.g., 
Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, 135 N.E.3d 1. 
 Moreover, unlike Cheryl Perich, the Respondent in 
this Court’s Hosanna-Tabor case, these two teachers 
gave no indications they were ministers. Neither ever 
used the title or took the tax status of a minister. In-
stead, they were named teachers and worked as teach-
ers. Morrissey-Berru is not Catholic, so there is no way 
she could be a Catholic minister. Biel was a Catholic 
laywoman, and all her life her church’s theology did 
not allow her to be a minister, and so the courts may 
not do so now. 
 The post-Hosanna cases show that many employ-
ees are harmed by the defendants’ easy use of the word 
minister to get rid of their cases. We present these re-
sults so that this Court clearly understands its legal 
need to protect all individual employees from harm, 
whether employed by a religious organization or oth-
erwise. Such absolute religious freedom for employers 
undermines the religious freedom of individual em-
ployees, which is also protected by the United States 
Constitution. 
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 Amici repeatedly and frequently protect people 
from abuse by religious and nonreligious actors. Many 
religious actors hide their wrongdoing instead of re-
vealing this abuse. This Court should remind the na-
tion’s lower courts that religious freedom does not 
protect illegal conduct, whether the sexual abuse of pa-
rishioners or age and disability discrimination against 
teachers. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or-
egon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). These cases 
should, and indeed can, be decided according to neu-
tral, generally applicable principles of law in the civil 
courts, as the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Sexual Abuse Cases Teach Us that the 
Courts Must Be Open to Protect Victims 
from Harm, Even By Religious Actors. 
 Amici are advocates who support children’s right 
to be free from sexual abuse as well as women’s and 
men’s right to freedom from sexual abuse and harass-
ment. Children’s advocates have taught us “child sexual 
abuse is both everyone’s problem and responsibility.” 
See Prevent Child Abuse America, Preventing Child 
Sexual Abuse, https://preventchildabuse.org/resource/ 
preventing-child-sexual-abuse/ (emphasis added). 
 Through the work of children’s rights advocates, 
amici have learned that “[o]ne in four girls and one in 
six boys will be sexually abused before they turn 18 
years old.” National Sexual Violence Resource Center, 
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Get Statistics, https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737. Adults 
face similar, and now more visible, problems with sex-
ual abuse and harassment in the workplace. Slowly, 
the courts have become more willing to hear their 
claims of sexual harassment and abuse and the leg-
islatures have moved to protect employees against 
their employers’ wrongdoing. See, e.g., Kirkland Alert,  
California Strengthens Sexual Harassment Laws in 
Wake of #MeToo, Jan. 14, 2019, https://www.kirkland. 
com/publications/kirkland-alert/2019/01/california- 
strengthens-sexual-harassment-laws; Kristen Ras-
mussen, Sexual Harassment Cases Surged Last Year in 
Wake of #MeToo: Seyfarth Report, LAW.COM, Jan. 7, 
2019, https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/01/07/ 
sexual-harassment-cases-surged-last-year-in-wake-of- 
metoo-seyfarth-report/?slreturn=20200025102719.  
Some law professors who support the ministerial ex-
ception have explained that it should not bar sexual 
harassment claims based on a pervasive, hostile envi-
ronment. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Robert W. Tuttle, #me-
too Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment 
Claims by Clergy and the First Amendment’s Religion 
Clauses, 25 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST. 
249, 249 (2019). 
 The lawyers’ path in abuse cases against religious 
perpetrators and entities has been difficult because, in 
the past, courts frequently protected such abuse, incor-
rectly believing that abuse-related decisions were pro-
tected by privacy or religious liberty. The courts rarely 
wanted to interfere with the free practice of religion. 
See, e.g., Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1997). 
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 The disgusting and pervasive facts about sexual 
abuse across the country, however, have changed the 
law’s perspective on the range of religious freedom. 
The lower courts have clarified that sexual abuse, and 
the protection of abusers from courts and police, are 
always against “neutral principles of law,” and can be 
handled justly by state and federal courts without in-
terfering with religious freedom. Allowing survivors of 
abuse into court is one of the best ways that everyone 
can receive justice. For example, the Illinois Supreme 
Court allowed one Jane Doe, who was sexually as-
saulted by a youth pastor at her church, to sue the pas-
tor and the church for negligent hiring, supervision, 
and retention. Doe v. Coe, 2019 IL 123521, 135 N.E.3d 
1, 19-20. Negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and 
negligent retention are all direct causes of action 
against the employer for the employer’s misconduct in 
failing to reasonably hire, supervise, or retain the em-
ployee. In the past, courts thought they were religious 
decisions. Now the courts recognize those cases can be 
decided according to neutral principles of law. Id. 
 State and federal prosecutors, judges, and legisla-
tors have increasingly recognized the need to protect 
children from religious wrongdoers, whether they are 
ministers who abuse children2 or their superiors who 
 
 2 Broadly speaking, amici hope the outcome of this case em-
phasizes the fact that religious organizations can and should be 
subject to neutral and generally applicable laws, because sexual 
abuse, assault, and harassment (among other claims) are not re-
lated to religious doctrine, with most religions preaching against 
this conduct. These claims, and those at issue in this case, can be 
decided without entanglement with religious doctrine. 
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work to systematically conceal misconduct from police. 
See, e.g., In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand 
Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018). Across the country, thou-
sands of children are in danger of abuse by these types 
of offenders whose misconduct may take decades to re-
veal, a lapse in time that is only amplified by systemic 
employer cover-ups. Id. 
 While this case does not involve children, this 
Court should clarify that religious freedom does not 
provide religious organizations freedom from neutral, 
generally applicable laws, or allow them to fire non-
minister teachers for disabilities or age. As in the sex 
abuse cases, such decisions have no relation to minis-
try, the only title expressly protected. Consequently, it 
is of vital importance that this Court clarify the law, 
thereby encouraging others to come forward and dis-
continue their silence for fear of dismissal of their 
cases by hesitant courts. As organizations and individ-
uals devoted to the protection of children’s and adults’ 
well-being, we urge this Court to affirm the correct de-
cisions of the Ninth Circuit that Biel and Morrissey-
Berru were teachers, not ministers, as well as reinforce 
and clarify the applicability of neutral and generally 
applicable laws to religious organizations. 
 
II. These Cases Can Be Decided According to 
Neutral Principles of Law. 
 This Court has long stated that religious actors 
are required to obey neutral laws because the rule of 
law protects everyone. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
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595, 604 (1979); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. 
of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). This Court 
should clarify that the neutral principles of law apply 
to this case. Consistent with this Court’s First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, state and federal courts have ab-
stained from hearing cases only when the dispute 
cannot be resolved according to neutral principles of 
law. See, e.g., Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 
426 S.W.3d 597, 618 (Ky. 2014) (“Secular courts may, 
however, have jurisdiction over a case involving a 
church if ‘neutral principles of law’ can be applied in 
reaching the resolution.”). 
 For this reason, courts allow lawsuits against a 
Christian seminary to proceed because the litigation 
can be resolved according to neutral, non-religious 
principles of law, just like the teachers’ case here. Id. 
at 615. See also Galetti v. Reeve, 331 P.3d 997, 1001 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (when tort and contract claims 
can be “ ‘resolved by the application of purely neutral 
principles of law and without impermissible govern-
ment intrusion . . . there is no First Amendment shield 
to litigation’ ”) (quoting McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 
840, 856 (N.J. 2002) (emphasis, internal quotation 
marks, and citations omitted)). 
 Petitioners mischaracterize Biel’s and Morrissey-
Berru’s cases as religious disputes that the courts can-
not adjudicate. This misinterprets the women’s law-
suits for disabilities and age discrimination, which can 
be determined according to neutral principles of law, 
just as the sex abuse cases have been. 
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 Biel filed a claim under the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) because her employer fired her after 
she began chemotherapy for breast cancer. According 
to the ADA: 
No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual on the basis of disability 
in regard to job application procedures, the 
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employ-
ees, employee compensation, job training, and 
other terms, conditions, and privileges of em-
ployment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability means “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities of such individual, a record 
of such an impairment; or being regarded as having 
such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102. 
 Biel easily, neutrally, and non-religiously can ar-
gue that she was discriminated against due to her 
breast cancer. Cancer qualifies as a disability under 
the statute: 
Despite significant gains in cancer survival 
rates, people with cancer still experience bar-
riers to equal job opportunities. Often, em-
ployees with cancer face discrimination 
because of their supervisors’ and co-workers’ 
misperceptions about their ability to work 
during and after cancer treatment. Even 
when the prognosis is excellent, some employ-
ers expect that a person diagnosed with can-
cer will take long absences from work or be 
unable to focus on job duties. 
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As a result of changes made by the ADAAA 
[ADA Amendments Act of 2008], people who 
currently have cancer, or have cancer that is 
in remission, should easily be found to have a 
disability within the meaning of the first part 
of the ADA’s definition of disability because 
they are substantially limited in the major life 
activity of normal cell growth or would be so 
limited if cancer currently in remission was to 
recur. 
U.S. E.E.O.C, Questions and Answers About Cancer in 
the Workplace, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/cancer.cfm  
(emphasis added) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) (“it 
should easily be concluded that the following types of 
impairments will, at a minimum, substantially limit 
the major life activities indicated . . . cancer substan-
tially limits normal cell growth”)); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) 
(1)(vii) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission 
is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life 
activity when active.”). 
 Biel’s employer was covered by the lawsuit, 42 
U.S.C. § 12112(a), and the school’s religious status has 
nothing to do with its liabilities toward employees who 
have no ministerial status. Biel’s firing demonstrates 
that she suffered “negative job action based on disabil-
ity.” Id. 
 Morrissey-Berru’s lawsuit can also be resolved ac-
cording to neutral principles of law. Morrissey-Berru 
filed an Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621, case against her employer. 
That law does not allow employers “to exclude or to 
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expel from its membership, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against, any individual because of his age.” 29 
U.S.C. § 623. Because Morrissey-Berru is a teacher, the 
lawsuit is about her age, and whether she was discrim-
inated against because of it. The courts can review  
age-related claims without paying any attention to 
Morrissey-Berru’s religion or her school’s religion. Her 
lawsuit can be decided according to neutral principles 
of law. 
 Like the sex abuse cases, both of these lawsuits 
can be litigated according to neutral principles of law. 
Neither Morrissey-Berru nor Biel, moreover, can be 
considered a minister. 
 
III. The Facts Show, as the Ninth Circuit 
Ruled, that Biel and Morrissey-Berru were 
both Teachers. 
 Biel was a teacher. Following this Court’s reason-
ing in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012), the Ninth Cir-
cuit distinguished Biel from Cheryl Perich, the plain-
tiff in Hosanna-Tabor. 
Biel, by contrast, has none of Perich’s creden-
tials, training, or ministerial background. 
There was no religious component to her lib-
eral studies degree or teaching credential. St. 
James had no religious requirements for her 
position. And, even after she began working 
there, her training consisted of only a half-day 
conference whose religious substance was 
limited. Unlike Perich, who joined the 
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Lutheran teaching ministry as a calling, Biel 
appears to have taken on teaching work wher-
ever she could find it: tutoring companies, 
multiple public schools, another Catholic 
school, and even a Lutheran school. 
Biel, 911 F.3d at 608. The court concluded there was 
nothing in Biel’s title, “Grade 5 Teacher,” or work that 
could lead to the conclusion she was a minister. Id. 
“And she neither presented herself as nor was pre-
sented by St. James as a minister.” Id. at 610. On the 
fourth part of this Court’s test, the court recognized 
that teaching lessons in the Catholic faith could not 
make her a minister: 
A contrary rule, under which any school em-
ployee who teaches religion would fall within 
the ministerial exception, would not be faith-
ful to Hosanna-Tabor or its underlying consti-
tutional and policy considerations. Such a rule 
would render most of the analysis in Ho-
sanna-Tabor irrelevant. It would base the ex-
ception on a single aspect of the employee’s 
role rather than on a holistic examination of 
her training, duties, title, and the extent to 
which she is tasked with transmitting reli-
gious ideas. 
Such a rule is also not needed to advance the 
Religion Clauses’ purpose of leaving religious 
groups free to “put their faith in the hands of 
their ministers.” . . . to comport with the 
Founders’ intent, the exception need not  
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extend to every employee whose job has a reli-
gious component. 
Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added). 
 Following Hosanna-Tabor, the Ninth Circuit also 
ruled that Morrissey-Berru was a teacher, not a minis-
ter. Her “formal title of ‘Teacher’ was secular.” Morris-
sey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461. 
Aside from taking a single course on the his-
tory of the Catholic church, Morrissey-Berru 
did not have any religious credential, training, 
or ministerial background. Morrissey-Berru 
also did not hold herself out to the public as a 
religious leader or minister. 
Id. Moreover, Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic. This 
alone proves she cannot be a Catholic minister by any 
stretch of the imagination. 
 The Ninth Circuit made a careful review of the 
facts in both these cases, determining that, as their ti-
tles demonstrated, these two teachers could proceed in 
their legal cases against their employers. Other courts 
have also concluded that teachers at religious schools 
are not automatically ministers.3 Courts have 
 
 3 See, e.g., Su v. Stephen S. Wise Temple, 32 Cal. App. 5th 
1159, 1161, 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 547 (Ct. App.), reh’g denied 
(Apr. 2, 2019), review denied (June 19, 2019), cert. dismissed, 140 
S. Ct. 341 (2019) (preschool teachers are not ministers); Starkey 
v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., No. 
119CV03153RLYTAB, 2019 WL 7019362 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2019) 
(allowing discovery to proceed for Catholic high school guidance 
counselor); Hough v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, No. CIV.A. 
12-253, 2014 WL 834473, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014) (mere  
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comments by employer about teachers’ ministerial status did not 
make them ministers pre-discovery); Bonadona v. Louisiana 
Coll., No. 1:18-CV-00224, 2019 WL 4073247, at *5 (W.D. La. Aug. 
28, 2019) (finding that a football coach is not a minister); Dias v. 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165, 
at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012) (a Non-Catholic Technology Coor-
dinator at a Catholic school is not a minister); Herx v. Diocese of 
Ft. Wayne-S. Bend Inc., 48 F.Supp.3d 1168, 1177 (N.D. Ind. 2014) 
(Catholic schoolteacher is not a minister, so her Title VII sex dis-
crimination and pregnancy discrimination lawsuits could pro-
ceed); Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F.Supp.3d 1132, 
1138 (D. Or. 2017) (Professor of Exercise Science was not a min-
ister); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 
136 F.Supp.3d 1094, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Catholic high school’s 
biology teacher was not a minister, even though she did some 
work for the campus ministry); Gallagher v. Archdiocese of Phila., 
2017 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 148, *24-25 (sixth grade teacher 
Cindy Gallagher was not a minister, she was a “lay teacher” at a 
Catholic school); Braun v. St. Pius X Par., 827 F.Supp.2d 1312 
(N.D. Okla. 2011), aff ’d, 509 F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2013) (reject-
ing ministerial exemption for lay teacher of secular subjects who 
was not member of parochial school faith); Redhead v. Conference 
of Seventh–Day Adventists, 440 F.Supp.2d 211, 221 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) adhered to on reconsideration, 566 F.Supp.2d 125 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (“plaintiff ’s teaching duties were primarily secular; those 
religious in nature were limited to only one hour of Bible instruc-
tion per day and attending religious ceremonies with students 
only once per year”); Guinan v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of 
Indianapolis, 42 F.Supp.2d 849, 852 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (“[plaintiff ] 
did participate in some religious activities as a teacher at All 
Saints, but it cannot be fairly said that she functioned as a min-
ister or a member of the clergy”); Galetti v. Reeve, 2014-NMCA-
079, ¶ 5, 331 P.3d 997, 999-1000 (Melissa Galetti, principal of a 
Seventh Day Adventist School, was not a minister); Mis v. Fair-
field Coll. Preparatory Sch., No. FBTCV166057613, 2018 WL 
7568910, at *3-4 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 12, 2018) (history teacher 
at Catholic high school is not a minister even though employers 
said he was really an Ignatian Educator). 
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similarly ruled that other employees of religious insti-
tutions are not ministers.4 Some courts have under-
stood this point and demonstrated that the 
employment laws can be applied to employees of reli-
gious organizations, including teachers, without ad-
verse effect on religious freedom.5 
 Like all these other employees, Biel and Morrisey-
Berru are not ministers, but are teachers. Therefore 
the ministerial exception does not apply. 
 
 4 See, e.g., Kelley v. Decatur Baptist Church, No. 5:17-CV-
1239-HNJ, 2018 WL 2130433 (N.D. Ala. May 9, 2018) (Kelley, a 
maintenance and child care employee at Baptist institution, could 
not be ruled a minister); Rose v. Baptist Children’s Homes of N. 
Carolina, No. 1:19-CV-620, 2019 WL 5575878, at *3 (M.D.N.C. 
Oct. 29, 2019) (married couple that was not hired because wife 
was deaf should not have their case dismissed at an early stage); 
Edley-Worford v. Virginia Conference of United Methodist 
Church, No. 3:19CV647 (DJN), 2019 WL 7340301, at *6-8 (E.D. 
Va. Dec. 30, 2019) (currently facts are insufficient to support min-
isterial exception); Davis v. Baltimore Hebrew Congregation, 985 
F.Supp.2d 701 (D.Md. 2013) (denying application of ministerial 
exception to employee whose primary duties—maintenance, cus-
todial, and janitorial work—were entirely secular); Bigelow v. 
Sassafras Grove Baptist Church, 247 N.C. App. 401, 402, 786 
S.E.2d 358, 360 (2016) (pastor can sue for breach of contract); Bar-
rett v. Fontbonne Acad., 2015 WL 9682042, at *10-11 (Mass. Su-
per. Dec. 16, 2015) (Food Service Director at Catholic school was 
not a minister). 
 5 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (high school teacher allowed to sue for age discrimina-
tion); Longo v. Regis Jesuit High Sch., 02-CV-001957-PSF-OES, 
2006 WL 197336 (D. Colo. Jan. 25, 2006) (ADA claim allowed for 
high school teacher); Welter v. Seton Hall Univ., 608 A.2d 206 
(1992) (computer professors allowed to sue a Catholic university 
for breach of contract). 
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IV. Neither the Non-Catholic Morrissey-Berru 
nor the Laywoman Catholic Biel Can Be-
come a Catholic Minister in Court. 
 One difficulty with the ministerial rule is that 
women employees of denominations that do not ordain 
women suddenly become ministers at the moment they 
file a lawsuit. Although Roman Catholic, Muslim and 
Orthodox Jewish women may not become priests, 
imams, or rabbis and perform their jobs with full un-
derstanding that they cannot be ministers, the courts 
and churches confer ministerial status upon them just 
long enough to keep their lawsuits out of court.6 
 
 6 Cases involving Catholic women incorrectly deemed minis-
ters for purposes of the ministerial exception include Fratello v. 
Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York, 863 F.3d 190, 203-04 
(2d Cir. 2017) (Catholic woman lay principal was ruled to be a 
minister); Ciurleo v. St. Regis Par., 214 F.Supp.3d 647 (E.D. Mich. 
2016) (Catholic grade school teacher is a minister); Ginalski v. 
Diocese of Gary, No. 2:15-CV-95-PRC, 2016 WL 7100558 (N.D. 
Ind. Dec. 5, 2016) (Catholic school principal is minister); Petruska 
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (non-ordained chap-
lain assured women were eligible for her position); Alicea- 
Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 
2003) (Catholic communications director); Skrzypczak v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(Catholic Director of Religious Formation); Musante v. Notre 
Dame of Easton Church, CIV.A. 301CV2352MRK, 2004 WL 
721774 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2004) (Director of Religious Educa-
tion); Pardue v. the Center City of Consortium Schools of the Arch-
diocese of Washington, Inc., 875 A.2d 669 (D.C. 2005) (school 
principal); Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. v. Minagorri, 954 So. 2d 640 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (school principal); Brazauskas v. Fort 
Wayne-S. Bend Diocese, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. 2003) (Director 
of Religious Education); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 
756 N.W. 2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (elementary school  
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 The Ninth Circuit’s decision was correct because, 
as a non-Catholic, Morrissey-Berru cannot be a Catho-
lic minister. Similarly, by Catholic theology Biel was a 
laywoman, not a priest. Indeed, as Catholic women 
learn in churches and schools across the world, she 
cannot be a priest. Accordingly the teachers’ work 
must be analyzed by the principles that apply to all 
teachers. 
 Agnes Morrissey-Berru is not Catholic. Our Lady 
of Guadalupe School, a Catholic school that does not 
require its employees to be Catholic, hired her as one 
of its teachers. She filed a lawsuit alleging age discrim-
ination against her employer. 
 That lawsuit should proceed. Even if some of Mor-
rissey-Berru’s responsibilities at the school were reli-
gious, the courts and the schools cannot turn a non-
Catholic into a Catholic minister. Ordaining her a  
minister in order to award her employer a court victory 
would violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment. 
 In Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-
00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012), for 
example, a non-Catholic Technology Coordinator was 
fired by a Catholic school. The Ohio district court re-
fused to recognize her as a minister. In Kant v. Lexing-
ton Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 587 (Ky. 2014), 
 
teacher); Sabatino v. Saint Aloysius Parish, 672 A.2d 217 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (high school principal); Coulee Catholic 
Sch. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, Dept. of Workforce Dev., 
768 N.W.2d 868 (Wis. 2009) (first grade teacher).  
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the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that a 
Jewish rabbi could not be called a minister at a Chris-
tian seminary, even though the seminary urged the 
ministerial title in order for the lawsuit to be dis-
missed. Kant participated in many religious ceremo-
nies and events, including the school’s chapel 
ceremonies. Using this Court’s Hosanna factors, the 
Court concluded Kant was not a minister. Id. at 591-
592. Therefore Kant was a professor whose breach of 
contract lawsuit could be heard by the court without 
violating the First Amendment. In Braun v. St. Pius X 
Par., 827 F.Supp.2d 1312 (N.D. Okla. 2011), aff ’d, 509 
F. App’x 750 (10th Cir. 2013), the court ruled a non-
Catholic fifth grade teacher at a Catholic school could 
not be a minister of the Catholic faith. As the Court 
concluded, “It is difficult to conceive that Braun might 
properly be classified as a minister of the Catholic faith 
when she is not even a member of that faith.” Id. at 
1319. 
 In a terrible case of kidnapping and torture, John 
Doe, a Muslim man born in Syria, argued that the 
Presbyterian Church wrongly put a video of his bap-
tism on the Internet, even though he had asked the 
church to keep news of his baptism private. Doe v. First 
Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, 421 P.3d 284, 291 
(Okla. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 940 (2019). As a 
response to the video, Doe was kidnapped and tortured 
by Syrian extremists. The appeals court dismissed any 
ministerial exception defense, noting “Doe simply 
asked for baptism, but never to become a member sub-
ject to the Appellees’ ecclesiastical hierarchy. Without 
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this consent, Doe’s religious freedom to not subject 
himself to the Appellees’ judicature must be respected 
and honored under the longstanding and clear consti-
tutional decisions from our Court and the Supreme 
Court of the United States.” Id. at 291. 
 Religious freedom principles keep non-Catholic 
Morrissey-Berru from being converted into a Catholic 
minister by the courts. 
 The courts would also violate the First Amend-
ment if they identified laywoman Kristen Biel as a 
minister. Biel is in similar circumstances to Cindy Gal-
lagher, a sixth grade “lay teacher” at a Philadelphia 
Catholic school. Gallagher v. Archdiocese of Phila., 
2017 Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 148, *24-25. 
[Gallagher’s] teaching qualifications or duties 
in no way compare to the called teacher in Ho-
sanna-Tabor. Appellee was not formally la-
beled a minister of the Catholic Church or 
even held herself out as a minister; Appellee 
did not plan or lead mass; Appellee was only 
considered to be a “lay teacher.” Thus, labeling 
Appellee as a minister of the church based on 
her role in prayer with her students and her 
participation in obtaining mandatory reli-
gious credits to be a teacher at the school 
would expand the scope of the ministerial ex-
ception beyond its intended purpose. Clearly, 
Appellee was not a minister for purposes of 
the ministerial exception. The record does not 
support a conclusion that Appellee was a min-
isterial employee. Accordingly, Appellee’s 
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defamation claim was not barred by the First 
Amendment. 
Id. 
 The Philadelphia court ruled there, as the Ninth 
Circuit did here, that the teachers’ responsibilities did 
not turn them into ministers. As Catholic laywomen, 
Biel and other Catholic women know very well that 
their church does not recognize women in its priest-
hood: 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church states 
that only men can receive holy orders because 
Jesus chose men as his apostles, and the 
“apostles did the same when they chose col-
laborators to succeed them in their ministry.” 
Blessed John Paul II wrote in 1994 that this 
teaching is definitive and not open to debate 
among Catholics. 
Francis X. Rocca, Why Not Women Priests? The Papal 
Theologian Explains, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REPORTER, 
Feb. 5, 2013, https://www.ncronline.org/news/theology/ 
why-not-women-priests-papal-theologian-explains 
(emphasis added). The article continued, the “son of 
God became flesh, but became flesh not as sexless hu-
manity but as a male, . . . since a priest is supposed to 
serve as an image of Christ, his maleness is essential 
to that role.” Id. (emphasis added). This is not a teach-
ing the courts can overturn without impermissible en-
tanglement. By making Biel and Morrissey-Berru 
ministers, the Court would be in violation of the Con-
stitution. 
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 A Vatican representative recently reasserted the 
“infallible” nature of the popes’ teaching on a male-only 
priesthood: 
The leader of the Vatican’s doctrine depart-
ment says the Church’s belief in a male-only 
priesthood is infallible teaching which should 
be held as an unchanging and “definitive” part 
of the Catholic faith. 
Delivering the most forthright doctrinal state-
ment so far against the ordination of women 
under Francis’ papacy, Cardinal-designate 
Luis Ladaria SJ says that maleness is “an in-
dispensable element” of the priesthood and 
that the Church is “bound” by Christ’s deci-
sion to only choose male apostles. 
Christopher Lamb, Vatican’s Doctrine Prefect Says 
Church Teaching on Male-Only Priesthood is “Defini-
tive,” THE TABLET, May 30, 2018, https://www.the 
tablet.co.uk/news/9167/vatican-s-doctrine-prefect-says- 
church-teaching-on-male-only-priesthood-is-definitive-  
(emphasis added). This theologian’s recent remarks 
confirmed the teaching of Pope John Paul II, who in-
sisted that “[p]riestly ordination . . . [has] from the 
beginning always been reserved to men alone.” John 
Paul II, Apostolic Letter Ordinatio Sacerdotalis, 1994, 
https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_ 
letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19940522_ordinatio- 
sacerdotalis.html (emphasis added). As Pope John 
Paul II added, “Therefore, in granting admission to the 
ministerial priesthood, the Church has always 
acknowledged as a perennial norm her Lord’s way of 
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acting in choosing the twelve men whom he made the 
foundation of his Church,” Id. As the pope concluded: 
Wherefore, in order that all doubt may be re-
moved regarding a matter of great im-
portance, a matter which pertains to the 
Church’s divine constitution itself, in virtue of 
my ministry of confirming the brethren (cf. Lk 
22:32) I declare that the Church has no au-
thority whatsoever to confer priestly ordina-
tion on women and that this judgment is to be 
definitively held by all the Church’s faithful. 
Id. Catholic priests have been disciplined or suspended 
for engaging in ministries with women. Id. 
 In contrast, the Catholic laity are recognized for 
their “secular” character. CWR Staff, Cardinal Arinze 
on the Role of the Laity, CATHOLIC WORLD REPORT, Oct. 
9, 2013. Kristen Biel always understood that she was 
a laywoman, not a priest or a minister. The courts need 
to recognize, as the Ninth Circuit did, that the status 
that she held did not ordain her to the priesthood. As 
well, Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic and the Court 
cannot redefine her faith into a faith that is not her 
own. 
 
V. Employees’ Religious Freedom is at Stake 
in These Cases. 
 In Hosanna-Tabor, this Court recognized that the 
two Religion Clauses mandate the Court’s recognition 
of a ministerial exception. That exception, however, is 
not absolute. As this Court held, each ministerial 
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exception case should be influenced by the specific 
facts before the court. The ministerial exception should 
not authorize courts to ordain plaintiffs when their 
own churches have not, nor should it exempt churches 
from all liability. 
 “The First Amendment stands as a bulwark 
against official religious prejudice and embodies our 
Nation’s deep commitment to religious plurality and 
tolerance. That constitutional promise is why, ‘[f ]or 
centuries now, people have come to this country from 
every corner of the world to share in the blessing of 
religious freedom.’ ” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 
2446-47, 201 L. Ed. 2d 775 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S., at 
___, 134 S.Ct., at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting)). See also 
Doe v. First Presbyterian Church U.S.A. of Tulsa, 421 
P.3d 284, 291 (Okla. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 940 
(2019). 
 As part of our blessing of religious freedom, the 
Free Exercise Clause reserves the right of American 
citizens to accept any religious belief, but limits their 
rights to action. Smith, 449 U.S. at 877. It does not al-
low religious employers to change their actions when 
they get to court if it keeps the case non-justiciable. In 
other words, although the freedom to believe is abso-
lute, the freedom to act, whether religiously motivated 
or otherwise, is not. 
 Under Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the 
government’s action in turning a non-Catholic woman 
and a Catholic laywoman into ministers would 
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substantially burden the two women’s religious beliefs. 
The government has no compelling interest to keep the 
present lawsuits out of court. Instead, the government 
has a strong interest in making sure that disabilities 
discrimination and age discrimination are prohibited 
for employers, and not excused away by falsely calling 
someone a minister. Under Sherbert and Smith, em-
ployers must obey the law when ministers are not in-
volved, as is true in this case. Id.; 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 The consequences of a pro-Petitioners ruling 
would be overwhelming if lay Catholic teachers were 
turned into ministers by the courts. “Sixty-six percent 
of private schools, enrolling 78 percent of private 
school students and employing 70 percent of private 
school FTE [full-time-equivalent] teachers in 2017-18, 
had a religious orientation or purpose.”7 In 2018-2019, 
there were 6,289 Catholic elementary, middle and sec-
ondary schools.8 In those schools, “non-Catholic stu-
dent enrollment has risen from 2.7% in 1970 to 11.2% 
a decade later and today is 18.7%.”9 In Catholic schools, 
3,344 schools with 113,152 students received Title I 
 
 7 STEPHEN P. BROUGHMAN, BRIAN KINCEL, JENNIFER PETER-
SON, CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: RESULTS FROM THE 2017-18 PRIVATE SCHOOL UNIVERSE 
SURVEY: FIRST LOOK (2019) 2, https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2019/ 
2019071.pdf. 
 8 DALE MCDONALD AND MARGARET SCHULTZ, UNITED STATES 
CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS: THE ANNUAL 
STATISTICAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS, ENROLLMENT AND STAFFING 
2018-2019, 155, https://www.ncea.org/ncea/proclaim/catholic_school_ 
data/catholic_school_data.aspx. 
 9 Id. at 349; see also id. at Exhibit 28. 
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aid; 2,756 schools with 133,104 students for breakfast 
and 210,084 for lunch received nutrition aid; 1,817 
schools with 197,623 students received transportation 
aid.10 Over the past decade, the lay faculty percentages 
increased from 93% to the current 97.2%. At present, 
only 2.8% of the professional staff are religious and 
clergy.11 
 The lay faculty, who generously give their lives to 
Catholic and non-Catholic students throughout the 
country, know very well that they are not ministers, 
just as their employers know they are not ministers 
until the very moment a lawsuit is filed. If the courts 
turn them into ministers, there is danger that they 
cannot practice their own religions or turn to the 
courts when their employers mistreat them. This 
Court should make clear that religious employers are 
not given freedom to discriminate against them in any 
way. 
--------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 “The clearest command of the Establishment 
Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be of-
ficially preferred over another.” Larson v. Valente, 456 
U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). The 
courts cannot prefer religion by giving religious em-
ployers a right to fire their teachers for disabilities or 
age discrimination. Or for sexual harassment and 
 
 10 Id. at 378; see also id. at Exhibits 35-37. 
 11 Id. at 151, 357; see also id. at Exhibit 31. 
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sexual abuse and other terrible things that happen to 
church employees and parishioners. 
 The courts are capable of adjudicating these em-
ployment cases against religious organizations with-
out need of the ministerial exception. These cases, like 
so many others, can be decided according to “neutral 
principles of law.” 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici urge the Court to 
affirm the decisions below. 
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